Ethics has been a problematic area for Marx ism ev er since its beginnings. Marx himself wrote v ery little on the topic, and what he did write seems paradox ical. On the one hand, he appears to deny that his outlook inv olv es ethical v alues at all. Socialism, he insists, is not a mere ethical ideal; it is rather the real and concrete form of society that will result from the rev olutionary forces currently at work in capitalist society . "The working classes hav e no fix ed and perfect utopias to introduce…they hav e no ideals to realise; they hav e only to set at liberty the elements of the new society which hav e already been dev eloped in the womb of the collapsing bourgeois society ". 1 On the other hand, there is quite clearly a moral dimension to his criticisms of capitalist society and his v ision of a socialist alternativ e.
These apparently conflicting strands of Marx 's thought hav e giv en rise to an enormous amount of controv ersy among subsequent Marx ist philosophers. Blackledge giv es an impressiv ely comprehensiv e and detailed account of these debates in this major new study . After describing the v iews of Marx and Engels on ethics, he then traces these controv ersies from the ideas of Second International figures such as Bernstein and Kautsky , and the responses of Lenin and Lukács, through the work of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Marcuse), Sartre and the British New Left (EP Thompson, Perry Anderson, Alasdair MacInty re), to the debates in contemporary academic philosophy . He deals not only with the ideas of recent analy tic philosophers like GA Cohen and Stev en Lukes, but also giv es an ex cellent account of recent discussion by continental philosophers, including Simon Crichley , Alain Badiou and Slav oj _i_ek. Interestingly , he shows how similar the ideas of these camps hav e been, though superficially they appear to be so different and disconnected.
Blackledge's own position emerges from this historical account. He rejects the v iew that capitalism is pregnant with the socialist future as a form of historical determinism that denies human freedom and political choice, and leads to ethical "nihilism". He associates this "obstetric" v iew (as GA Cohen called it) particularly with the dogmatic certainties of "Stalinism", though in fact it is more widespread than any thing that can be encompassed ev en by such a catch-all term, and comes from Marx himself as the quotation abov e illustrates.
Howev er, as the rev olutionary potential of the working class has increasingly come into question, many hav e argued that the Marx ist critique of capitalism and its v ision of socialism are embodied in univ ersal ethical principles rather than on problematic historical grounds. Blackledge rejects this sort of ethical approach as well. Marx ism does inv olv e an ethic, he maintains, an ethic of freedom-but this is not an abstract moral doctrine deriv ed from disinterested or univ ersal principles. The v alues of Marx ism arise out of the concrete situation and actual struggle of the working class to ov erthrow capitalism and to create socialism. When Marx say s that the working class has "no 2/3 www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=859&issue=136 ideals" to realise "he should not be understood…as suggesting that Marx ists hav e no v ision of a better future", but rather that their v alues are "immanent" and "rooted in the real mov ement of things" (p1 33).
This may seem to lead inev itably to relativ ism. Howev er, the rev olutionary working class is not simply one particular and sectional interest group in capitalist society . As the agents that are struggling to create socialism and transcend class div isions, workers are "the potential agents, not only of their own liberation, but also of the univ ersal liberation of humanity " (p53). Thus, like Lukács, Blackledge argues that the working class is potentially the "univ ersal class". Moreov er, the v alues that it represents hav e not been imposed upon it ex ternally from on high, but are immanent in society itself. "Freedom is best understood as an immanent potential which ev olv es ov er time through a process of collectiv e struggles" (p57 ).
The idea that the working class is a rev olutionary force in modern capitalist conditions is widely questioned. It is mainly because of doubts on this score that many Marx ists hav e abandoned the rev olutionary basis of Marx ism and settled instead for an abstract, ethical utopianism of a sort that Marx himself ex plicitly repudiated. It is one of the main strengths of Blackledge's book that he confronts this issue so directly . In response to the non-rev olutionary conditions that now ex ist, Marx ists should adopt what Lucien Goldmann called a "tragic v ision": without a basis for hope, they should nev ertheless continue to hope (p1 41 ). They should look bey ond the limits of the present through a "wager" on future possibilities of change. "Marx ism inv olv es not a deterministic prediction of the socialist future of humanity but rather a wager on the rev olutionary potential of the proletariat" (p1 42). This wager is based ultimately on the solidarity that dev elops in working class struggles. These require and ex hibit the socialist "v irtues" of community and cooperation. They prefigure a future socialist society and demonstrate its feasibility .
In making these arguments, Blackledge draws heav ily on some early writings by Alasdair MacInty re. At first, this may seem a surprising source. MacInty re is now a Catholic social philosopher steeped in Aristotelianism who rejects Marx ism. Howev er, in an earlier period he was an activ e Marx ist-initially as a member of the Communist Party , then in the British New Left, and then as a Trosky ist in the Socialist Labour League and the International Socialists (pp1 85-1 86). 2 The Aristotelian language of "v irtue" seems an anachronistic way to describe the ethics of Marx ism. More importantly , it is doubtful whether the social psy chology of small scale struggles can prov ide a sufficient basis for a socialist ethics. Feelings of solidarity are a feature of many kinds of protest mov ement. A socialist ethic needs a more specific grounding.
Fundamental to Marx ism is the insight that there are far larger, objectiv e-economic, social and historical-forces at work within capitalism, creating the contradictions that will lead towards a specifically socialist society in the future. The operation of these is largely passed ov er in Blackledge's account, which portray s Marx ism in political terms as primarily a philosophy of rev olutionary struggle.
Marx is referring to these objectiv e forces with the "obstetric" picture that Blackledge is so critical of. No doubt Blackledge is right to question the simple determinism that can easily be read into this picture. But we must be careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Marx ism is not simply a philosophy of political commitment and struggle. It essentially inv olv es a historical theory according to which capitalism is only a particular and limited stage that, because of the objectiv e conflicts at work within it, is destined to come into crisis and to generate the forces that will lead to its ov erthrow and to a new and better form of society ("better" in the sense of freer, as Blackledge argues).
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Though he objects to Marx 's "obstetric" language, Blackledge cannot so easily reject the aspect of Marx 's thought that it describes. Indeed, he relies on it when he argues that the working class is a rev olutionary force "immanent" within capitalism. True, this is not a purely mechanical process guaranteed automatically to deliv er a better society . Nev ertheless, according to Marx this will happen as a matter of fact. And, if it does, it will do so partly because the capitalist sy stem will generate increasingly sev ere and incapacitating crises, 3 and partly because political forces will arise to abolish capitalism and build a new society .
For Marx , the main component of this force will be the working class. That is where the problem lies. Though capitalism has led to recurrent and sev ere crises, there is no sign of the emergence of a rev olutionary working class. It cannot be conjured up by political commitment alone. If it does emerge that will be because larger-social, economic and historical-forces are at work, driv en ultimately by the increasing socialisation of the means of production and ex change.
That is to say , the "wager" on the emergence of rev olutionary forces that Marx ism makes is not based only on the ex perience of solidarity in struggle, but on the ex istence of objectiv e forces at work in capitalist society . To say this is not to deny freedom or to ex clude a role for ethics, as Blackledge fears. Correctly understood, freedom does not ex ist only in the absence of determining conditions; it is not a merely negativ e phenomenon. It depends not only on the remov al of the restraints of capitalist society ; it requires also the creation of positiv e conditions which enhance people's abilities and giv e them the power actually to ex ercise freedom and choice. This has been, and will be, the effect of the social and historical dev elopments that Marx describes.
These are large and fundamental issues. The most important thing about Blackledge's book is that it raises them. It mov es bey ond what has become the well-worn ground of the dispute within Marx ism between ethical nihilism and univ ersalism and takes the debate onto more substantial and promising new ground. 3: There is a quasi-mechanical aspect to the occurrence of economic crises, in that the market is an alienated sy stem out of people's power to control.
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